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Matthew L.M Fletcher* & Peter S. Vicaire**
1. INTRODUCTION
In March 2011, the United States submitted a brief in United States v. al
Bahlul, a military commission case reviewing the conviction of a war-on-
terror suspect, comparing the tactics Indians used in the First Seminole War
to al Qaeda,' an argument the Court partially accepted in a companion case,
United States v. Hamdan.2 As government lawyers had argued in the days
following September 11, 2001, the government in al Bahlul argued that the
Seminole Tribe in the 181 Os engaged in a form of "irregular warfare" not for
the purpose of establishing a nation or state, much like al Qaeda in the
modem era.3 The military's comparison of Indian tribes to modem
international terrorist organizations strikes a divisive chord in Indian country
and elsewhere, as modem Indian tribes are as far removed from al Qaeda as
can be. And yet, the government continues to juxtapose the Indian warrior
stereotype with modem law and policy, as this Article will demonstrate.4 As
our colleague Professor Wenona Singel asked, "Who would be persuaded by
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law; Director, Indigenous Law and Policy
Center. Miigwetch to Wenona Singel, Kate Fort, Brian Gilmore, and Brent Domann, who assisted on
the research for this paper.
** Tribal Government Relations Specialist, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
1. See Appellee's Response to the Specified Issues at 25, United States v. al Bahlul, No.
CMCR 09-001, 2011 WL 4916373 (U.S. Ct. of Military Comm'n Review Sept. 9, 2011), available
at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/bahlul-brief-irt-specified-issues- 11 -mar-201 I.pdf.
2. See United States v. Hamdan, No. CMCR 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at 52-53 (U.S. Ct.
of Military Comm'n Review June 24, 2011), available at http://turtIetalk.files.wordpress.com/
2011/07/hamdan-opinion.pdf. The Military Commission Review Court eventually decided al-Bahlul
and made no reference to American Indian wars. See United States v. al Bahlul, No. CMCR 09-001,
2011 WL 4916373 (U.S. Ct. of Military Comm'n Review Sept. 9, 2011), available at http://turtle
talk.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/al-bahlul-uscmcr-decision-sept-9-201 I.pdf.
3. Legality of the Use of Military Commissions To Try Terrorists, 25 Op. O.L.C. 1, 25
(2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2001/pub-millcommfinal.pdf (citing WILLIAM
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 464, 832 (2d ed. 1920) and WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER,
MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 353 (3d ed. 1914)).
4. Apparently, the military continues to fight Indian wars, as the code name for Osama bin
Laden was "Geronimo." See Mark Mazzetti et al., Behind the Hunt for Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, May
2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/world/asia/03intel.html.
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such an argument?" 5
The United States historically has swept up American Indians and
Indian tribes along with larger policy choices. The Indian "problem" of the
Framers-acquiring valid title and control over American Indian
resources -eventually became the Indian "wars" of the latter half of the
nineteenth century.7 From the earliest days of European and American
interaction with Indian people, the perceived violent, savage, and inferior
character of Indians has dominated intergovernmental affairs between the
two groups.8 The Indian wars over resources largely are over, but American
"wars"-on poverty, drugs, and terror-continue to sweep up American
Indians and Indian tribes into the morass of federal government
policymaking. In recent decades, major American domestic reform
initiatives have come to resemble in rhetoric if not action the virulent
opposition to Indians and tribes dating back to the nineteenth century.
This Article analyzes American history from the modern wars on
poverty, drugs, and terror from the perspective of American Indians and
Indian tribes. These domestic wars are aptly named, as the United States
often blindly pursues broad policy goals without input from tribal interests
or consideration of the impacts on Indians and tribes. With the possible
exception of the war on poverty, these domestic wars sweep aside tribal
rights, rights that are frequently in conflict with the overarching federal
policy goals.
Modem federal Indian law and policy recognizes tribal self-
determination and emphasizes government-to-government relations, called
in short, the trust relationship. The United States's domestic wars, usually
announced with much fanfare but without reference to Indian affairs, have
alternately exploited and ignored the trust relationship to advance national
goals.
The "declaration" of the domestic wars is nothing more than a move
toward the fundamental reconsideration of the foundations of the rule of law
in these contexts. In innumerable instances relating to Indian affairs, the
federal (and occasionally state) government has justified its actions relying
on one of these domestic wars. And in many of these instances, major shifts
5. Interview with Wenona T. Singel, Assistant Professor of Law, Mich. State Univ. Coll. of
Law & Assoc. Dir., Indigenous Law & Policy Ctr., in East Lansing, Mich. (Mar. 15, 2011).
6. See generally STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER
ON THE FRONTIER (2005) (tracking the history of the transfer of tribal lands to the U.S. government
from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries).
7. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 233-83 (1970)
(describing how the North Plains and Northwest Tribes fought for their land).
8. See generally PETER SILVER, OUR SAVAGE NEIGHBORS: How INDIAN WAR
TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA (2008) (describing conflicts between Indians and settlers in early
America).
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in Indian law and policy occur that, absent the domestic war, would likely
have been otherwise declared illegal. This is not to say that tribal interests
have never benefitted from a domestic war, because they have benefitted
marginally in some eras. But when a domestic war that negatively affects
Indian country is declared, the impacts are nothing short of devastating.
This Article explores three declared domestic wars and their impacts on
American Indian tribes and individual Indians, in loose chronological order,
starting with the war on poverty. As Part II demonstrates, the Johnson
Administration's Great Society programs helped to bring American Indian
policy out of the dark ages of the era of termination, in which Congress had
declared that national policy would be to terminate the trust relationship.
Part III describes the war on drugs, declared by the Reagan Administration,
which had unusually stark impacts on reservation communities, both in
terms of law enforcement and also on American Indian religious freedom.
Part IV examines the ongoing war on terror, which Bush Administration
officials opined has its legal justification grounded in part on the Indian wars
of the nineteenth century. The war on terror marks the United States's return
to fighting a new Indian war, where the adversary is illusive and motivated
and where the rule of law is obliterated.
II. THE WAR ON POVERTY
Although President Johnson's war on poverty was intended for broader,
nation-wide purposes, it had an unintended but positive side-effect for
Indians and Indian tribes: the nurturing of Indian self-determination. This
was achieved by earmarking federal funds directly to tribal governments
rather than to federal agencies, as the United States had always done, which
infused tribal entities with new powers and responsibilities. But however
good the war on poverty programs were for Indians and Indian tribes, with
the changing of the political guard in Washington, D.C., they eventually
withered away. Regardless, the war on poverty in Indian country brought
about changes that in many ways transcended material impoverishment.
In 1970, when Edwin Starr belted out the soulful lyrics to the anti-
Vietnam War song, War,9 he likely had not considered the positive effects
that the war on poverty had been having in Indian country since 1964. That
year, President Johnson exclaimed, "This administration today, here and
now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America."10 It was a
determined effort to address the chronic unemployment and poverty in many
9. EDWIN STARR, War, on WAR AND PEACE (Gordy Records 1970) ("What is it good for?
Absolutely nothing[!] Say it again, y'all[!]").
10. President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 8, 1964), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/presidents/36_ johnson/psources/psunion64.html (providing a
transcript of the address).
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areas of the nation. The declaration was just one facet of the "Great
Society," an was an expansive set of domestic programs that Johnson
proposed or enacted, which in addition to poverty, included education, civil
rights, healthcare, arts and cultural interests, transportation, the environment,
and consumer protection, as well as various urban-renewal projects and job-
training programs."
The war on poverty was warmly received in Indian country, so long as
it preserved the tribal-federal relationship and did not "terminate" Indian
tribes. 12 But it is not clear that President Johnson's awareness of the effects
of the war on poverty in Indian Country even mattered. As this Article will
show, the war on poverty would still pay off great dividends for Indians
outside the boundaries of material poverty, even saddled with Johnson's
benign indifference. It would be "the harbinger of tribal self-
determination."13
Born and raised in Texas, a state with no Indian population,14 Johnson
seemingly did not develop much concern for Indian people. His own
biographical account of his presidential years says nothing of Indian tribes,"
and during his twenty-three years in Congress (eleven years in the House of
Representatives and twelve years in the Senate), he had no direct
involvement with any Indian policies. However, in 1961, as Vice President,
he did meet once with delegates from the American Indian Chicago
Conference (AICC),16 a week-long gathering of 467 Indians hailing from
ninety different Indian communities from across the country."
Johnson and the AICC members discussed the AICC's Declaration of
11. See generally JOHN A. ANDREW III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY (1999)
(describing Great Society programs of the 1960s); THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF
LIBERALISM (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2005) (reviewing the Great Society's
domestic programs).
12. See generally Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes:
From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251 (1995) (describing the federal
programs supporting tribal self-governance).
13. Daniel M. Cobb, Philosophy ofan Indian War: Indian Community Action in the Johnson
Administration's War on Indian Poverty, 1964-1968, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 71, 71
(1998).
14. During Johnson's many years as a Congressman (1937-1960), there were no federally
recognized tribes in Texas. However, since the 1960s, the Alabama-Coushatta Tribes, the Kickapoo
Traditional Tribe of Texas, and the Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo of Texas have been federally recognized.
15. LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY,
1963-1969 (1971).
16. Cobb, supra note 13, at 72.
17. Laurence M. Hauptman & Jack Campisi, The Voice of Eastern Indians: The American
Indian Chicago Conference of 1961 and the Movement for Federal Recognition, 132 PROC. AM.
PHIL. Soc'Y 316, 316 (1988).
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Indian Purpose18 and "how future legislation could incorporate the need for
tribal self-determination, local control of resources, and federal assistance
with economic development."' 9 Most importantly, the Declaration called for
the programs to be developed by the Indians themselves and was based on
the notion that "[w]hat we ask of America is not charity, not paternalism,
even when benevolent. We ask only that the nature of our situation be
recognized and made the basis of policy and action."20 The AICC's
Declaration condemned the termination era, called for new policies that
were based on a "broad educational process," and provided specific
recommendations in the areas of economic development, education, health,
housing, and law, including treaty rights. 2 1 Perfectly timed for the oncoming
war, the Declaration encapsulated a significant departure from the status quo
of the early 1960s.
It is unknown how much the AICC's Declaration swayed Johnson. As
noted above, he did not mention Indians at all in his biography, let alone the
AICC, and he took no action after the meeting. In fact, after a quick fifteen
minutes with the delegation, he was already on the phone dealing with other
matters. 22 However, three years later, as President, he specifically mentioned
Indian reservations in his State of the Union address when he declared:
[O]ur joint Federal-local effort must pursue poverty, pursue it
wherever it exists-in city slums and small towns, in sharecropper
shacks or in migrant worker camps, on Indian Reservations, among
whites as well as Negroes, among the young as well as the aged, in
the boom towns and in the depressed areas.2 3
But that was the extent of Johnson's attention to Indian affairs; he was much
18. Declaration of Indian Purpose at the American Indian Chicago Conference at the
University of Chicago, (June 13-20, 1961) [hereinafter Declaration] (condemning termination,
calling for new policies based on a "broad educational process," and providing specific
recommendations in the areas of economic development, education, health, housing, and law,
including treaty rights). A portion of the Declaration of Indian Purpose is available online. Native
American Voices, DIGITAL HISTORY, http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/native-voices/native
voices.cfm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (scroll down to "Part 5: The Struggle for Self-Determination"
and then follow the "Declaration of Indian Purpose" hyperlink); see also THOMAS CLARKIN,
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS, 1961-1969, at 18
(2001).
19. Cobb, supra note 13, at 73.
20. Hauptman & Campisi, supra note 17.
21. See Declaration, supra note 18; see also CLARKIN, supra note 18.
22. CLARKIN, supra note 18, at 108.
23. LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1963-1964, at
114 (1965).
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more concerned with the African-American Civil Rights Movement.24
The Johnson Administration rarely mentioned American Indians in the
war on poverty because it was trying to devise a poverty plan that was not
based on race.2 5 Civil rights were already a contentious issue, and the
Johnson Administration did not want to enmesh the war on poverty with the
more expansive civil rights legislation being fought in Congress at the same
time.26 After meeting with President Johnson, Robert Bumette, a Sicangu
(Brul6) Sioux political leader and activist, felt that the President's "interest
was motivated by political considerations rather than by a concern for Indian
problems." 27 Regardless of Mr. Burnette's opinion of Johnson's true
machinations, Johnson's war on poverty would still have monumental, albeit
unintended, effects in Indian country.
During the opening volleys of the war, Johnson had in his political
arsenal an impressive 61.1% of the popular vote, carrying forty-four states as
well as the District of Columbia, while his Democratic Party held a total of
295 seats in the House and sixty-eight in the Senate. 28 With this copious
political ammunition at Johnson's disposal, Congress passed eighty-four of
his eighty-seven legislative proposals. 2 9 Even though none were specifically
aimed at Indians or Indian tribes, they were directed at helping the poor,
which Indians certainly were. 30 And so, in 1964, war once again came to
Indian country, heralded by Johnson's State of the Union address on January
8, 1964."
One of Johnson's "generals" in the war on poverty was Secretary of the
Interior Stewart Udall, a Kennedy appointee who took the Arizona
delegation for Kennedy from Johnson in the 1960 Democratic National
Convention. 32 Recalling a later encounter with President Johnson, Udall said
that "it was very clear that he knew what I had done, and I was sort of on the
24. CLARKIN, supra note 18, at 108.
25. IRWIN UNGER, THE BEST OF INTENTIONS: THE TRIUMPHS AND FAILURES OF THE GREAT
SOCIETY UNDER KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND NIXON 50 (1996).
26. Id.
27. ROBERT BURNETTE, THE TORTURED AMERICANS 82 (1971).
28. THOMAS C. REEVES, TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY 181 (2000).
29. CLARKIN, supra note 18, at 106.
30. See, e.g., Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286; Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006)).
31. See Johnson, supra note 10.
32. Interview by W.W. Moss with Stewart L. Udall, Former Sec'y of the Interior (1961-1969),
in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 12, 1970), available at http://archivel.jfklibrary.org/JFKOH/Udall,%20
Stewart%20L/JFKOH-SLU-01/JFKOH-SLU-01-TR.pdf (providing a transcript of the original
interview).
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edges of the thing."33 When Johnson assumed the presidency, many,
including Udall himself, believed that he would dismiss Udall from his
cabinet position for his political transgressions. 34 But corroborating Robert
Burnette's view of Johnson's apparent "political considerations," the
President stated, "'you should know by now that I'm a better politician than
to fire any of Kennedy's cabinet at this time."' 35
Consequently, Udall stayed on as Secretary of the Interior and served as
a link for the direction of Indian affairs in the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations. "Under JFK, Udall and his staff ... had new ideas which
had lain dormant. Under Johnson, new ideas were the order of the day, and
when Johnson retained Udall as secretary of the interior the stage was set for
the emergence of new thinking in Indian affairs." 36 Interestingly, Johnson
has been quoted as saying that "[a]s a matter of fact, to tell the truth, John F.
Kennedy was a little too conservative to suit my taste."" Therefore, as
Thomas Clarkin has noted:
[T]he most important development in Indian affairs during the
early years of the Johnson administration did not originate in the
Interior Department; rather, Lyndon Johnson, a career politician
with no background in Indian policy, brought the greatest changes
to the lives of Native Americans through his commitment to
battling poverty in America.
For tribes seeking a way to attain self-determination, Johnson's unrelated
political motivations were a welcome happenstance.
A. The Office of Economic Opportunity
Although it was an unintended side-effect, the war on poverty was still
an important factor in the emergence of self-determination for Indian tribes,
made possible by the strengthening of the trust relationship between the
United States and the various Native American nations.39 Kevin Washburn
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. CLARKIN, supra note 18, at 107.
36. GEORGE PIERRE CASTILE, To SHOW HEART: NATIVE AMERICAN SELF-DETERMINATION
AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1960-1975, at 24 (1998).
37. Carl M. Brauer, Kennedy, Johnson and the War on Poverty, 69 J. AM. HIST. 98, 114
(1982).
38. CLARKIN, supra note 18, at 108.
39. See generally Christopher K. Riggs, American Indians, Economic Development and Self-
Determination in the 1960s, 69 PAC. HisT. REv. 431 (2000) (describing the major policy changes in
federal Indian affairs of the 1960s, the transition period between the anti-tribal era of "termination"
207
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believes that the initiatives created from the war on poverty had "more
positive effects for Indian tribes than any federal 'Indian policy' initiative
has ever had. Indeed ... modem tribal governments were born from the War
on Poverty programs."40
The war on poverty entailed enactment of the Economic Opportunity
Act (EOA) as an "umbrella" for the creation of a series of programs such as
the Peace Corps, Head Start, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA),
Upward Bound, the Job Corps, Legal Services, the Neighborhood Youth
Corps, the Community Action Program, the Work-Study program,
Neighborhood Development Centers, small business loan programs, rural
programs, migrant worker programs, remedial education projects, local
healthcare centers, and social benefits stemming from the Food Stamp Act,
Medicare and Medicaid, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and the Fair Housing Act.4 1 On the economic front, Johnson
pushed EOA 42 through Congress, of which its pidce de rdsistance was the
creation of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the agency
responsible for administering most of the war on poverty's programs. 43 The
first director of the OEO, R. Sargent Shriver, tasked James Wilson with
heading a department that concentrated solely on Indian country." Wilson's
self-admitted flanking attack was to act as a "small 'a' activist" and a "big
'M' Manipulator" to manipulate the system of federal-government dealings
with Indians so they would eventually gain more political power.45
Although EOA itself made no specific mention of American Indians,
tribes, or reservations, its legislative history did establish that Indians were
to be at "the forefront of the [Office of Economic Opportunity] program. "46
"The drafters of the OEO bill, however, never thinking of tribes as
of the 1950s to the pro-tribal era of "self-determination" of the 1970s).
40. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777,
792 (2006).
41. S. Michael Miller & Martin Rein, Will the War on Poverty Change America?, 2 SOC'Y 17,
19 (1965); see also Hubert H. Humphrey, The War on Poverty, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 6, 8-
16 (1966) (detailing the major programs in the war on poverty).
42. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
43. SCOTT MYERS-LIPTON, SOCIAL SOLUTIONS TO POVERTY: AMERICA'S STRUGGLE TO
BUILD A JUST SOCIETY 216 (Charles Lemert ed., 2007).
44. DANIEL M. COBB, NATIVE ACTIVISM IN COLD WAR AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR
SOVEREIGNTY 103 (2008).
45. Id.
46. Examination of the War on Poverty Program: Hearings on H.R. 10440 Before the
Subcomm. on the War on Poverty Program, 88th Cong. 313 (1964) (statement of Stewart Udall,
Secretary of the Interior); see also Cobb, supra note 13, at 102-24 (describing the importance of
Office of Economic Opportunity to Indian country).
[ 15:2012]208
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governments, considered only three possible ways to deliver OEO services
to Indians: through the [Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)], through the states,
or through both the BIA and the states. In addition no one had consulted
with tribal leaders."47 But in time, Indian-specific issues would necessitate
the creation of "Indian desks" in the OEO and other agencies, such as the
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Housing, Labor, and Urban
Development.48 The presence of these Indian desks meant that the funds
were routed apart from the general, non-Indian programs, which in turn was
a recognition of the distinct nature of tribes as self-governing, albeit poverty-
stricken, bodies.49 The OEO put the engine, which was made with Indian
parts, in place; it just needed some fuel, which would be delivered in short
order and in a manner quite beneficial to Indian tribes.
Where the Indian programs, from the onset, would be recognized as
unique by their initial funding method, they would also assume a distinctly
Indian character on the receiving end. Programs implemented community
action programs (CAPs) to promote "maximum feasible participation" of the
impoverished in both creating and implementing the actual programs.50
Actual members of the community were themselves tasked with organizing
community action agencies, developing proposals, applying for grants, and
overseeing their programs "without interference from local, state, or federal
officials."51 Shades of the earlier demands of the AICC as written in the
Declaration ofIndian Purpose were coming to fruition.
By giving tribes large amounts of federal funds and minimal
interference from the federal government in their allocation, these CAPs
effectively served as a backdoor to greater self-determination rights. There
were more unforeseen changes on the horizon; Indians wanted more than to
just create and administer federal programs. "Indian country was beginning
to stir, and the talk was about sovereignty, about tribal governments."5 2
In May 1964, several Indian activists planned a gathering in
Washington, D.C., which they named the American Indian Capital
47. Charles Wilkinson, "Peoples Distinct from Others:" The Making of Modern Indian Law,
2006 UTAH L. REv. 379, 382 (2006).
48. Paul H. Stuart, Government Agencies, in NATIVE AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 210, 212 (Mary B. Davis ed., 1994).
49. DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KilWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 207 (3d ed. 2011).
50. Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance, New
Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
1,1(2010).
51. CLARKIN, supra note 18, at 110.
52. Wilkinson, supra note 47, at 383.
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Conference on Poverty." In attendance were Vice President Hubert
Humphrey, Stewart Udall, and several influential members of Congress. The
Indian leaders stated "their case for self-determination, for the right to run
their own programs, and 'the right to be right and the right to be wrong."' 54
They were successful in their goal by adding to EOA three seemingly
innocuous words to the definition of who could receive OEO funds-those
words being "a tribal government."55 According to Charles Wilkinson, these
were "the very first words in the entire history of the Republic that Indian
people had ever conceived of and lobbied into federal legislation." 56 Thus, in
a perfect storm of the national Civil Rights Movement, including the heady
"Red Power" political activism of the time, the OEO provided funds and
responsive federal representatives, and tribes gained a strong foothold in the
pursuit of reclaiming their inherent rights of self-determination.57
Between 1964 and 1976, tribes became direct sponsors of several
federally funded programs through which they ultimately received 122
million dollars. But instead of the federal government funneling money
through the BIA, as it always had, it directed money straight to the tribes
themselves, creating tension between CAP administrators and BIA
employees. 59 The influx of federal monies infused tribal governments with
new, unseen powers. "Under the Indian Reorganization Act, tribal
governments never really functioned. But when the OEO was established,
tribal governments had the funds to begin.. . reservation economic
development."60 Again, the engine was in place; the OEO provided the fuel.
The OEO also enabled several universities to bypass the BIA and
provide workshops directly to tribal leaders for proposal writing, report
53. Shirley Hill Witt, Nationalistic Trends Among American Indians, 6 MIDCONTINENT AM.
STUD. J. 51, 66 (1965).
54. Wilkinson, supra note 47; American Indian Capital Conference on Poverty: A Statement
Made for the Young People by Melvin Thom-May, 1964, in RED POWER: THE AMERICAN INDIANS'
FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 65, 65-66 (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., ed., 1971) [hereinafter RED POWER).
55. Wilkinson, supra note 47.
56. Id. (citing Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2790(a)-(f), repealed by
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 519 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9902 (2000))).
57. "Red Power" is a term often attributed to noted Indian activist and author Vine Deloria, Jr.
and represents a growing sense of pan-Indian identity during the late 1960s. For an interesting look
at Red Power political activism, see RED POWER, supra note 54.
58. Alfonso Ortiz et al., The War on Poverty, in INDIAN SELF RULE: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS
OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 220, 220 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986)
[hereinafter INDIAN SELF RULE].
59. See CLARKIN, supra note 18, at 117-22.
60. Ortiz et al., supra note 58, at 223.
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filing, accounting, and creating a new class of Indian leadership.6 ' Tribes
"became quite skilled at ... lobbying various federal agencies and Congress.
As a result, [they] became eligible for virtually every new program
authorized during the rush of social, educational, and economic legislation
during this period."6 2 All the CAP action on reservations demonstrated that
tribes could achieve self-administration of federally funded programs. 63
D'Arcy McNickle, a long-time employee of the BIA, opined of the
OEO that the "transferal of authority and responsibility for decision-making
to the local community was an administrative feat that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, after more than one hundred years of stewardship, had never
managed to carry out."64 Ladonna Harris recalled that the "OEO taught us to
use our imagination and to look at the future as an exciting adventure." 65
Well-known Indian activist Russell Means claimed that the OEO "was the
best thing ever to hit Indian reservations. "66 With a long-buried sense of
autonomy reemerging, tribal governments finally
had money and were not beholden for it to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. This created an enormous change in the balance of power
on reservations and in Washington.. .. [The OEO] altered the
nature of the [BIA] and the relationship between tribes and the
federal government. . . . [It] changed the face of Indian affairs in a
way that will never completely be reversed.67
B. The End of the War and Its Collateral Damage
However, even though there was a rush of social-welfare funding and
policy initiatives, many tribes and individual Indians were still not ready to
assume autonomous financial and administrative responsibilities. As such,
many reservations "have remained insular islands awash in adversity and
61. Id. (noting the OEO enabled Arizona State University, the University of Utah, and the
University of South Dakota to bypass the BIA).
62. DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
144 (2d ed. 2007).
63. CASTILE, supra note 36, at41.
64. D'ARCY MCNICKLE, NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM: INDIAN SURVIVALS AND RENEWALS
119(1973).
65. Ortiz et al., supra note 58, at 224.
66. RUSSELL MEANS & MARVIN J. WOLF, WHERE WHITE MEN FEAR TO TREAD: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF RUSSELL MEANS 137 (1995).
67. Philip S. Deloria, The Era of Indian Self-Determination: An Overview, in INDIAN SELF-
RULE, supra note 58, at 191, 196.
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poverty."68 Further, one commentator has noted that the OEO caused an
unforeseen problem when it
diverted the attention of Indian people from their sacred land.
People ran over each other to get jobs at $2.50 an hour. They
forgot all of the things that they had learned as Indian people,
because they were so eager for employment. Everybody wanted to
go to work and move off their land.69
Still, that same commentator acknowledged that the OEO produced many
Indian leaders and "did a lot of good in the field of education and in the
social service areas."7 o
Much like the month of March, the war on poverty came in like a lion
and went out like a lamb. Robert Bumette recalls, "I do not remember any
tribe, individual, or organization recommending amendments to the OEO
act. It faded away and nobody went to battle for it. There were no
organizations set up to fight for the improvement of the OEO."7 1 By 1966, it
was apparent that Congress favored some programs over others, and
unfortunately for Indian tribes, the CAPs fell into the "disfavored" pile. 72 In
1975, Congress dismantled the OEO and replaced it with the Community
Services Administration (CSA). This sped up the process by which Congress
transferred favored programs to already-established agencies, such as the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.73 The death knell came in
1981 when President Reagan abolished the CSA, leaving only a few
scattered, emaciated remnants of the war on poverty.74
Ultimately, of course, poverty was not eliminated; the war was lost.
Indeed, in 1988, twenty-four years after Johnson threw down the gauntlet,
President Ronald Reagan delivered his own State of the Union address and
claimed that the war on poverty had failed: "My friends, some years ago, the
Federal Government declared war on poverty, and poverty won."75 Of
68. Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in
Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 8, 34 (2009).
69. Ortiz et al., supra note 58, at 226.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 227.
72. MICHAEL L. GILLETTE, LAUNCHING THE WAR ON POVERTY: AN ORAL HISTORY 360 (2d
ed. 2010).
73. Id. at 401-02.
74. Dara Z. Strolovitch, Politics and Federal Policy, in I POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS AND POLICY 548, 550 (Gwendolyn Mink & Alice
O'Connor eds., 2004).
75. President Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 25, 1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=36035#axzz
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course, Reagan's address can be seen as merely a partisan attack on "big
government" and the Democratic Party's politics, which were in direct
contrast to the Reagan Administration's long-standing "less government"
approach. Taking an even more negative stance than Reagan, one
commentator has argued that the social programs implemented during the
"war" actually worsened the economic position of poor people. 7
Regardless of the view that the war was ineffective at decreasing
poverty, it did help Indian tribes in other ways. Although tribes still
generally remain poor today,78 the war on poverty brought about changes
that in many ways transcended material impoverishment.
III. THE WAR ON DRUGS
The Reagan Administration's war on drugs79 had a major impact on the
daily lives of American Indians. Even today the effects of the war on drugs
continue to influence tribal public policy dramatically in relation to tribal-
government employees, tribal law enforcement, and even tribal public-
housing policy.so As a direct result of the public policies articulated during
that period, Indian tribes continue to press for drug testing of tribal-member
employees and tribal-housing occupants.8 This Part examines American
Indian tribes' use of drug testing and other tools in the war on drugs in two
areas: (1) tribal-government employment and (2) tribal housing. The third
subpart examines how the war on drugs has affected the United States and
state government policies in Indian country.
It is no secret that many American Indians harbor addictions to drugs
IXOsyo7WO (providing a transcript of the address).
76. In 1964, Ronald Reagan delivered a speech, A Time for Choosing, on behalf of and
sponsored by Barry Goldwater's Republican presidential campaign. Ronald Reagan, A Time for
Choosing (Oct. 27, 1964), available at http://www.nationalcenter.org/ReaganChoosingl964.html
(providing the transcript of the speech). It was highly critical of Johnson's Great Society programs.
Id. By the time Reagan dismissed Johnson's war on poverty in 1988, he had already declared his
own war on organized crime in 1986. Ronald Reagan, Declaring War on Organized Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
77. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984).
78. See Angelique Eaglewoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics: The Historical and
Contemporary Impacts of Intergenerational Material Poverty and Cultural Wealth Within the
United States, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 805, 825-29 (2010).
79. President Reagan may have escalated the war on drugs, see President's Radio Address to
the Nation, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1249 (Oct. 2, 1982), but it was President George H.W.
Bush who actually appointed a "Drug Czar." See Gun S., Inc. v. Brady, 711 F. Supp. 1054, 1056-57
(N.D. Ala. 1989).
80. See infra Part III.A.
81. See infra Part III.
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and alcohol.8 2 These addictions are likely a product of many generations of
poverty, disillusionment, and perhaps even centuries-old federal Indian
policy.83 Colonial and federal treaty negotiators used alcohol to fuel vast
land cessions,8 4 and Indian alcohol abuse has been used to exploit Indian
people in a variety of contexts.8 ' As a result, Indian tribes often dedicate
significant tribal resources toward responding to alcohol and drug abuse,
often going out of their way to divert first-time drug offenders to non-
adversarial drug courts or to support tribal members and their families
affected by addiction.86 Many reservation communities established culturally
specific and culturally appropriate treatment programs, with some
outstanding results.87 As tribal programs often are creative and beneficial,
tribal governments have motivation to respond with every resource available
because the future existence of tribal people depends on the success of these
programs.88
However, the war on drugs initiated a few unusual habits among tribal
governments, namely the policy of random drug testing of tribal employees
in non-safety-sensitive positions, such as clerical or secretarial workers.
More recently, drug testing became a precondition to eligibility for tribal
82. See NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, Do ALL INDIANS LIVE IN Tipis?
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM THE NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 95 (2009).
83. Cf CHARLES E. CLELAND, RITES OF CONQUEST: THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF
MICHIGAN'S NATIVE AMERICANS 133 (1992) (alleging that colonial alcohol policy may have been a
cause of the 1763 war initiated in part by the Ottawa leader Pontiac).
84. See generally PETER C. MANCALL, DEADLY MEDICINE: INDIANS AND ALCOHOL IN EARLY
AMERICA (1997) (explaining the influence of alcohol on treaty negotiations dating back to the
seventeenth century).
85. See generally Robert J. Miller & Maril Hazlett, The "Drunken Indian": Myth Distilled
into Reality Through Federal Indian Alcohol Policy, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223 (1996) (explaining how
federal Indian alcohol policy perpetuates the myth of Indian alcoholism).
86. See generally Ronald Eagleye Johnny, The Duckwater Shoshone Drug Court, 1997-2000:
Melding Traditional Dispute Resolution with Due Process, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 261 (2002)
(explaining the development of the drug war on the Duckwater Shoshone Drug Court and
demonstrating the therapeutic value of the method).
87. E g., Douglas K. Novins et al., Use of Biomedical Services and Traditional Healing
Options Among American Indians: Sociodemographic Correlates, Spirituality, and Ethnic Identity,
42 MED. CARE 670 (2004).
88. For example, many Indian tribes disfavor closed adoptions of Indian children in even the
worst cases in order to preserve the remaining positive aspects of tribal family relationships. E.g.,
Lorinda Mall, Keeping It in the Family: The Legal and Social Evolution ofICWA in State and Tribal
Jurisprudence, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30, at 164 (Matthew
L.M. Fletcher et al. eds., 2009).
89. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Drug War on Tribal Government Employees:
Adopting the Ways of the Conqueror, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1 (2003) (criticizing the
imposition of random drug tests by tribal governments on its employees).
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public-housing services. 90 More often than not, tribal officials allege that
drug-testing requirements are requirements for federal funding, perhaps
misreading the regulations.9 ' Both of these tribal-government policies can
potentially wreak great harm on Indian communities.
Along with harsh, zero-tolerance criminal-sentencing rules that have
placed untold thousands of nonviolent, first-time offenders in federal
prisons, 9 2 random drug testing became a critical tool in the war on drugs.93 It
has become normal that persons in the criminal justice system-from
released convicts to first-time probationers-be subjected to random and
intrusive drug tests for years at the end of his or her sentence.9 4 Within a
decade, several federal employees and public officials challenged the
constitutionality of random and pretexual drug-testing requirements in front
of the Supreme Court.95 Many state and federal government employers
became enamored with the simple method of testing urine, blood, hair, and
other organic materials as a means of proving exactly who was taking
drugs.96 Of course, these tests are not infallible.97 With false positives and
negatives rendering the outcomes of the tests practically random, drug users
became exceptionally successful in developing ways to counteract the
tests.98 One particularly unforeseen outcome to drug testing was that the
90. See infra Part II.B.
91. See supra Part II.
92. See generally Nekima Levy-Pounds, Can These Bones Live? A Look at the Impacts of the
War on Drugs on Poor African-American Children and Families, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 353 (2010) (discussing prison policies for drug offenders and the effect on the African-
American community).
93. Within a few years of the declaration of the war on drugs, drug testing became pervasive
in the American criminal justice system. See generally Eric D. Wish & Bernard A. Gropper, Drug
Testing by the Criminal Justice System: Methods, Research, and Applications, 13 CRIME & JUST.
321 (1990). Two decades later, even high schools now frequently, and with "fervor," expose their
students to random drug testing. See Susan P. Stuart, When the Cure Is Worse Than the Disease:
Student Random Drug Testing & Its Empirical Failure, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1055, 1061 (2010).
94. See Andrew J. Smith, Unconstitutional Conditional Release: A Pyrrhic Victory for
Arrestees' Privacy Rights Under United States v. Scott, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2365, 2370
(2007).
95. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
96. Cf John Edward Failla, Note, A Proposal for Mandatory Drug Testing of Federal Civilian
Employees, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 322 (1987) (discussing the federal government approach to employee
drug abuse).
97. Some studies indicate a high degree of false positives in random drug tests. See BEVERLY
A. POTTER & SEBASTIAN ORFALI, DRUG TESTING FOR WORK: A GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS 146
(1998).
98. See AMITAVA DASGUPTA, BEATING DRUG TESTS AND DEFENDING POSITIVE RESULTS 1-9
(2010).
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occasional marijuana user would be encouraged to switch to a different,
more dangerous drug, such as cocaine, which processes through the human
body faster than marijuana, making it, therefore, less detectable. 99 Moreover,
civil libertarians have repeatedly and persuasively attacked drug testing for
the violations of privacy resulting from the test.100
A. Tribal-Government Employees
Indian tribal governments often succumbed to random drug testing as a
means of combating drug and alcohol addiction within their jurisdictions.
Many tribes require drug testing as a precondition of employment, causing
lenders to drug test some soon-to-be tribal-government employees before
their employment as a precondition to a home-ownership loan. Tribal-
government employees, far more so than other reservation residents, are
more likely to purchase a home in conjunction with accepting a tribal-
government job. Other tribes require some form of drug testing during
employment as well, such as the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, both of which impose random testing
on all employees."o' Other tribes, such as the White Mountain Apache Tribe,
may subject tribal employees to random testing if reasonable suspicion
exists.102
Random drug testing of employees of tribal governments is
exceptionally harmful on a number of levels. As a matter of logic, few if any
tribal employees demonstrate any drug or alcohol problems, or else they
would not be employed in the relatively few on-reservation jobs available.
Any addicted employees have numerous means to avoid or obfuscate the
results of drug tests, no matter how random. Additionally, for tribal
employees that are tribal members, drug testing is inherently invasive and
99. See Edward Shepard & Thomas Clifton, Drug Testing and Labor Productivity: Estimates
Applying a Production Function Model, WORKING USA, Dec. 1998, at 69 ("[T]o avoid a negative
result on a drug test, workers may switch to 'harder drugs', like heroin, cocaine, or amphetamines,
which do not remain in the system as long. Or they might switch to alcohol, or drugs that are not
tested for, which could have more significant adverse effects on performance and health.").
100. E.g., Privacy in America: Workplace Drug Testing, AM. C.L. UNION (Mar. 12, 2002),
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice-womens-rights/workplace-drug-testing; Steven Wisotsky, A
Society of Suspects: The War on Drugs and Civil Liberties, CATO INST. (Oct. 2, 1992),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pal80.pdf.
101. See EASTERN BAND OF THE CHEROKEE NATION CODE, ch. 96, art. 9, § 9.05(B) (2010)
(detailing the tribe's drug and alcohol policy and stating that "[a]ll employees are subject to random,
unannounced testing"), available at www.narf.org/nill/Codes/ebcicode/96employees.pdf; LITTLE
RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS, ch. 600, § 9.11 (1998) ("Any
person employed by the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians may be tested at random.
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/lrcode/lrcode6.htm.
102. See WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE, PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL
§ IX(B)(8)(i) (2005), available at http://wmat.us/Legal/PersonnelPolicy.html.
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runs counter to tribal traditions.10 3 Some forms of drug testing require the
removal of a strand of hair, and in most Indian communities, hair is sacred;
the forced removal of an Indian person's hair could be devastating.104 The
taking of urine samples is similarly rote with difficulty, given that Indian
women are forbidden from certain ceremonies (even drug testing) during
their monthly cycle.'0 5 The same goes for blood testing.o' Finally, random
drug testing generates a fear of a false positive in all employees, for many
people know, or inflate, the fallibility of the test.
Additionally, as our former student Adrea Korthase persuasively wrote,
the financial cost to the tribal government is substantial, in addition to the
social and cultural impacts:
[T]he cost of random drug testing [is] $42 per person plus many
other costs. Making sure that confidentiality is maintained as well
as ensuring that there are no false positive, [sic] make the process a
very expensive one. The tribe will also have to hire people to
administer the drug tests. [There is] an even higher cost to "catch"
a drug user. It is an expensive process and may force the tribe to
make some financial concessions.
Random drug testing may also force the tribe, and its members,
to make some concessions when dealing with the community.
These concessions may turn out to be even more costly than the
financial commitment. From a physical standpoint, tribal members
may be opposed to giving up hair or urine samples because of
religious and cultural beliefs. From a societal standpoint, it is
probable that ... friends and family may have to order, or submit
to, drug tests on one another. This may create an irreparable
tension. Worse yet is the possibility that younger people may have
to order drug testing on tribal elders who are well respected pillars
of the community. In such a small community, these are issues that
the tribal council should not take lightly. 0 7
Yet many tribal governments proceed to initiate random drug testing without
serious consideration of these concerns, perhaps on the theory that tribal-
government employees, as pillars of the community, must be proven to tribal
constituents to be absolutely clean.'08
103. See Fletcher, supra note 89, at 63-65.
104. Id. at 30.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Adrea Korthase, Random Drug Testing I (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors).
108. The drug testing of tribal-enterprise employees, especially casino employees, on the other
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B. Tribal-Housing Tenants
In recent years, increasing numbers of tribal governments are imposing
drug testing as a precondition for tribal public-housing eligibility, ostensibly
under the theory that federal law and regulations require such testing.109 For
example, the Umatilla Reservation Housing Authority initiated a drug
testing requirement in 2010.110 Other tribes require applicants for tribal
rental housing to pass a preliminary drug screen as well, including the
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe."' The Umatilla announcement noted the
presence of drugs and gangs on the reservation, suggesting that a
constitutional challenge to the requirement could be defended by claims that
public safety is a sufficiently compelling governmental interest.l 12
In comparison, non-tribal public-housing programs, such as those in
certain areas of Chicago, occasionally require drug testing.' "3 Public-housing
programs have also denied access to public housing to people who have a
drug conviction." 4 But even though governments have long imposed various
forms of zero tolerance on their public-housing tenants, to dramatic effect," 5
hand, might not have the same impact, given that Indian gaming is a cash-heavy business prone to
attracting nefarious criminal elements. That said, enterprise employees still have many of the same
due process and privacy concerns as multiple complex cases decided by the Mashantucket Pequot
tribal courts demonstrate. E.g., Techlowec v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 4 Mash. Rep.
197, No. 2003-0176, 2004 WL 5374145 (Mashantucket Pequot Trib. Ct. 2004) (upholding the
termination of an employee); Louchart v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 3 Mash. App. 7, No.
1999-0161, 2000 WL 35571834 (Mashantucket Pequot Ct. App. 2000) (reversing termination on
basis of positive drug test where management had no "reasonable suspicion" to test employee);
Bums v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 3 Mash. Rep. 208, No. 1999-0114, 2000 WL
35571835 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. 2000) (affirming employment termination despite policy
violation by management).
109. We thank Brian Gilmore, the Director of the Michigan State University Housing Clinic,
for bringing this to our attention.
110. See URHA Starts Drug-Test Policy: Housing Cracks Down on Drug Use in Rentals, XIII
CONFEDERATED UMATILLA J., no. 3, Mar. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.umatilla.nsn.us/
CUJ201OMarch.pdf.
111. Housing Division, MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE, www.muckleshoot.nsn.us/services/
community-development/housing-division.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
112. Cf Fletcher, supra note 89, at 59-60.
113. Lisa T. Alexander, A Sociolegal History of Public Housing Reform in Chicago, 17 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 155, 160 (2008).
114. Robin Levi et al., Creating the "Bad Mother": How the US. Approach to Pregnancy in
Prisons Violates the Right To Be a Mother, 18 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 13 (2010) (citing the
Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(s)-(t) (2006)).
115. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002); see also Regina Austin,
"Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother's Back": Poor Moms, Myths ofAuthority, and Drug-Related
Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273 (2002) (discussing how innocent
family members of drug-law violators are evicted from public housing as well); Nekima Levy-
Pounds, Beaten by the System and Down for the Count: Why Poor Women of Color and Children
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drug testing does not appear to be an integral part of public-housing policy.
Although more tribes now rely on drug testing, the most successful
tribal drug-control programs in tribal housing completely exclude drug
testing.116 Instead, these drug-control programs focus on culturally
appropriate measures that include law enforcement and children's
education.' Some evidence suggests a hardline war on drugs in Indian
country is unnecessary.
At least one tribal court has addressed the importance of drug testing
tribal-housing tenants and ruled against an effort by a tribal-housing
authority to evict a tenant for the use of drugs." In Washoe Housing
Authority v. Sallee, tribal police stopped a tribal-rental-housing tenant who
was traveling as a passenger in a car." 9 As a matter of common practice, the
tenant submitted to a "presumptive drug test," and the results tested positive
for trace amounts of illegal drugs.120 After the tribal-housing authority
initiated eviction proceedings based on tribal policy that prohibited the "use"
of illegal drugs "on or near project premises," the court rejected the housing
authority's claims, holding instead that the policy never defined those terms,
nor did the drug test serve as sufficient proof of the tenant's drug use.121
C. American Indian Religious Freedom
The Reagan-Era war on drugs had an additional impact on Indian
country: restrictions on religious freedom.122 This impact was likely far
greater in symbolic terms to American Indian people than drug testing. In a
shocking move in 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v.
Smith, which struck down key components of First Amendment
jurisprudence previously enjoyed by the supporters of the separation
Don't Stand a Chance Against U.S. Drug-Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 462, 492-94
(2006) (noting that persons with prior drug convictions are banned from public housing).
116. See VALERIE SENECA & LEEANNA ARROWCHIS, NAT'L AM. INDIAN HOUS. COUNCIL,
BUILDING THE FRAMEWORK: SIX CASE STUDIES: TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION UTILIZING
NAHASDA ACTIVITIES 30-34 (2002), available at www.naihc.net/uploads/research/CaseStudy
final.pdf.
117. See id.
118. See Washoe Hous. Auth. v. Sallee, No. ICTN/AC CV-03-022, 2006 WL 6351179 (Nev.
Inter-Tribal Ct. App. 2006).
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *3.
122. See generally FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
RELIGION CLAUSES 32-36 (2007) (describing Employment Division v. Smith and its impact on
religious freedom).
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between church and state.123 In a fairly significant move, Congress enacted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as an overt attempt to
overturn the decision, an effort that only affected federal government
actions. 124 Smith not only changed the character of the national debate over
religious freedom, but it also sharply circumscribed the constitutional
protection afforded American Indian religious practitioners.
It should be noted that Oregon employed a litigation strategy relying
heavily on the war on drugs and intended to provoke the Supreme Court into
action against the Native American Church practitioners who were seeking
protection.1 2 Famed legal commentator Sanford Levinson described this
strategy:
Oregon's brief in Smith is certainly replete with language
suggesting the magnitude of its interests. Beginning with mention
of the "drug crisis pervading every facet of our citizens' lives,"
Attorney General David Frohnmayer, the principal signatory of the
brief (and the oral advocate before the Court in Smith IV), goes on
to note that Oregon, like the United States, includes peyote in the
list of so-called Schedule I drugs-those presenting the greatest
danger to users. Interestingly enough, the argument against
"accommodating" Native American users of peyote is directed far
less at any dangers presented by Native Americans themselves, or
potential costs to the state were only Native Americans exempted,
and far more at the impossibility of limiting exemptions in this
manner. That is, "[a]s a constitutional matter, any protection
extended to [Native Americans] for their religious peyote use
should honor not only their claim to religious freedom, but it
should honor all others on like terms." Given the wide number of
religious sects that incorporate drug use into their ceremonies or
rituals, though, this reasoning would, if taken seriously, wreak
havoc with Oregon's "compelling interest in comprehensive drug
control." If not taken seriously-that is, if exemptions as a matter
of fact were limited to Native Americans-then the victim would
be the Establishment Clause's requirement of "religious
123. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
124. The Supreme Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, struck down RFRA as applied to states,
but the statute remains viable as applied to the federal government. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997); see also Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006). Congress attempted to reverse Boerne in the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. (2006), and the constitutionality
of that statute as applied to states has not yet reached the Supreme Court.
125. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State Interest: On "Due Process of
Lawmaking" and the Professional Responsibility of the Public Lawyer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1035,
1054-55 (1994).
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neutrality."l 26
Professor Levinson noted that eighteen months after the oral argument in
Smith, the Oregon Department of Justice had the opportunity to support its
anti-drug position when requested to offer testimony to the Oregon
legislature about an amendment to the state's drug laws.' 27 However,
Oregon declined to mention anything relating to the compelling interest
noted above, provoking Levinson to argue:
I find it difficult to interpret Mr. Lidz's testimony as other than a
denial of central aspects of Oregon's case as presented to the
Supreme Court eighteen months before. The interests of Oregon so
vividly and passionately portrayed to the Court, including the
"devastating" impact a general religious exemption would have on
Oregon's "compelling interest in controlling dangerous drugs,"
have, in effect, disappeared from view. There is nothing said to
remind the legislators of the Department's 1987 opposition,
presumably based on these same law-enforcement concerns, to the
proposed grant by the Oregon Board of Pharmacy of an exemption
to the Native American Church for its use of peyote. To be sure,
the Department never once indicates its actual support for the
exemption, but this absence of overt support seems secondary to
the silence that has almost deafeningly replaced the Department's
former statements.' 28
The Smith decision contributed to a long history of disrespect for
American Indian religions. In 1978, Congress enacted the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA),12 9 a statement of policy supporting Indian
religious freedom in light of concerted efforts by federal agencies and
officials to thwart it.'30 AIRFA defined the practice of "traditional religions"
to include without limitation "access to sites, use and possession of sacred
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional
rites."' 31
The impetus for AIRFA was a study conducted by the House of
Representatives that concluded the federal government was restricting
Indian religious freedom in at least three ways.13 2 First, federal agencies
126. Id. at 1054-56 (footnotes omitted).
127. See id. at 1056.
128. Id. at 1058-59 (footnotes omitted).
129. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
130. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 95-1308 (1978), available at 1978 WL 8715.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
132. H.R. REP. No. 95-1308 (1978), available at 1978 WL 8715.
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such as the U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, and the Bureau of
Land Management frequently prevented Indians from entering federal land
where sacred sites were located.133 Moreover, the agencies refused to allow
the burial of tribal leaders in tribal cemeteries located on federal land.134
Second, federal law enforcement officials regularly confiscated substances,
such as peyote, used by Indians for religious purposes-even though federal
cases had protected the use of these substances as a bona fide religious
sacrament.135 Federal officials also confiscated animal parts, such as turkey
and eagle feathers, from endangered species that Indians used in religious
ceremonies.136
Third, the House of Representatives found that federal agents directly
and indirectly interfered with tribal ceremonies and religious practices. 137
For example, federal officers had a long history of opposing and restricting
the practice of tribal religions through the enforcement of Bureau of Indian
Affairs-authored reservation law and order codes that flatly prohibited most
tribal religious ceremonies.' 38 These law and order codes were enforced in
Courts of Indian Offenses, with judges hand-picked by federal officers.' 39
Federal courts in cases such as United States v. Clapox upheld federal
regulations allowing the prosecution of Indians engaging in traditional
religious practices. 140 On-reservation federal Indian agents, as a matter of
administrative practice, obstinately remained on the grounds at Rio Grande
pueblos during religious ceremonies requiring that no non-Indian be
present.14' Federal law enforcement officers would also do little or nothing
to stop unwelcome onlookers from interfering in tribal religious
ceremonies. 142 The House also found that federal officials had either directly
interfered or allowed interference in tribal religious practices because they
personally rejected Indian religions.14 3
133. See id. at *2.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at *3.
137. Id.
138. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE
230-39 (1983).
139. Id.
140. See United States v. Clapox et al., 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888).
141. See Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953. A Case Study in
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 359 (1953).
142. Id.
143. See H.R. REp. No. 95-1308 (1978), available at 1978 WL 8715, at *3.
222 [ 15:2012]
HeinOnline  -- 15 J. Gender Race & Just. 222 2012
Indian Wars: Old & New
IV. THE WAR ON TERROR: THE NEW INDIAN WAR?
The modem war on terror is a war that defies definition and has no
obvious termination point, boundary, or even a determination of whether the
enemy is foreign or American. The modem war on terror is both a domestic
and foreign war. For many in the federal government, the closest analogs to
the war on terror are the Indian wars of the nineteenth century fought by the
United States against Indian people.'" The worst violations of the rule of
law by the United States-indefinite detention without charge, torture, and
indiscriminate killing-appear in both the war on terror and the Indian wars.
For some, it is logical that the legal principles that supposedly justified the
Indian wars now are used to justify the war on terror. Part IV.A quickly
reviews the history of wars between the United States and Indian tribes as a
lead-in to the modem version of the "Indian war"-the war on terror.
A. Old Indian Wars
In general, Indian wars involved Indian tribes both within and outside
the boundaries of the United States, including its territories. Indian people,
often unaware or uninterested in artificial boundary lines, crossed over
borders (even into Canada and Mexico),145 much like the modem enemies of
the United States cross borders with impunity.146 Indian tribes, sometimes
highly hierarchical and organized and other times disparate and dynamic, do
not always meet a traditional definition of "state" at any given time, much
like modem American enemies.147 Perhaps most importantly, Indian tribes
fought guerrilla wars, what American leaders and commentators would now
refer to as terrorism.148 In short, many legal advisers in both the nineteenth
and twenty-first centuries have held international norms and rules of war not
to apply in each respective case.
Consider the mass executions of Dakota Indians at Fort Snelling in
144. E.g., United States v. Hamdan, No. CMCR 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at 52-53 (U.S. Ct.
of Military Comm'n Review June 24, 2011), available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/201 I/
07/hamdan-opinion.pdf.
145. E.g., Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210, 1213-14, 1219 (D. Me. 1974).
146. Cf Peter Andreas, Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century,
28 INT'L SECURITY, no. 2, 2006 at 78.
147. See Steve Russell, The Racial Paradox of Tribal Citizenship, 46 AM. STUD., no. 3, 2005 at
177-78 (discussing "Westphalian" statehood and Indian tribes). Cf Sanford Levinson, Shards of
Citizenship, Shards of Sovereignty: On the Continued Use of an Old Vocabulary, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 601, 602 (2004) (detailing "Westphalian" borders).
148. E.g., Barry M. Pritzker, First Seminole War, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN
INDIAN WARS, 1607-1890: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY 715, 716 (Spencer C.
Tucker ed., 2010).
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1862 and the internment and forced removal of hundreds of other Dakotas at
the same time. 149 In the months leading up to the conflict between the
Dakota people and the United States, American traders exploited and
cheated Dakotas without objection or interference from the American
military and Indian agents tasked with maintaining the peace.150
Additionally, the United States's promised treaty annuities were late in
coming, a tactic that Indian agents had repeatedly used to extract
concessions or punish the Dakota people.' 5 ' The inevitable conflict that
followed involved the killing of hundreds on both sides.' 52 Eventually,
roughly 2000 Dakotas gave up the fight and the American military took
them into custody.153 The sham trials that took place after the Dakota
surrender are well documented, and the execution of thirty-eight Dakota
Indian men followed.'54 The American military then incarcerated 1600
Dakota Indians who had survived the executions in internment camps in
Iowa and South Dakota and imprisoned dozens of others in military jails.iss
The Fort Snelling executions and the incarcerations of the Dakota
people parallel modern American prisons at Guantinamo Bay and
elsewhere. The facts of both events involve people held for many years,
almost always without charge.156 The government charges such prisoners
under military commissions without adequate due process or criminal
procedure rights.' 57 At least some of the prisoners are American citizens or
can stake a claim to American citizenship.'58 And the prisoners are declared
prisoners of war, despite the lack of a congressional declaration of war, or
worse, they are "unlawful enemy combatant[s]."' 59 In the case of the Dakota
prisoners, their only hope was a pardon or commutation of sentence from the
149. See Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice,
43 STAN. L. REv. 13, 15-46 (1990).
150. Id. at 17.
151. See id. at 15-17.
152. Id. at 21-22.
153. Id. at 21.
154. See id. at 22-37.
155. See Chomsky, supra note 149, at 38.
156. E.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 646 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting
that Salim Hamdan had been held for four years without charge).
157. See Chomsky, supra note 149, at 94.
158. E.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) (noting Jos6 Padilla is an American
citizen).
159. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (adjudicating the status of "enemy
combatants").
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U.S. President, much like Guantinamo Bay detainees.' 60 Finally, even the
prisoners who are pardoned by the U.S. President or subject to a release
order from a federal court are sent away to a foreign landl 61-in the case of
Guantanamo detainees, any nation that will accept their presence, except
their homelands.' 62
The Dakota military trials are not the only cases in which the United
States overreached in exercising executive (military) authority to punish
American Indians. In the Modoc Indian War of 1873, for example, the
Attorney General opined that Indians accused of killing American
negotiators under a flag of truce had engaged in a war with the United
States, and so could be subject to a military trial and executed without
congressional authorization, but under the laws of war.'63 President Andrew
Jackson even convened a military commission to try two non-Indians
(English subjects) that had incited Creek Indians to war.' 64 Congress has
expressly authorized military actions against Indian tribes in other contexts
as well.165
The Bush Administration's attorneys used the United States's often
vicious response to various Indian wars as a close analog to the war on
terror. Consider this Office of Legal Counsel memorandum declassified and
made public in 2009, expressly stating that Indian wars of the nineteenth
century were "closely analogous" to the 9/11 attacks:
American precedents also furnish a factual situation that is more
160. See Maeve Herbert, Explaining the Sioux Military Commission of 1862, 40 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 743, 777-83 (2009) (discussing President Lincoln's views on pardoning the Dakota in
1862).
161. See generally William E. Lass, The Removal from Minnesota of the Sioux and Winnebago
Indians, 38 MINN. HIST. 353 (1963) (discussing removal of Sioux and Winnebago Indians from their
homeland).
162. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010)
(involving the government's detention of Chinese Uighurs); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme
Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110
COLUM. L. REv. 352, 369-70 n.73 (2010).
163. E.g., The Modoc Indian Prisoners, 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 249, 253 (1873).
164. Legality of the Use of Military Commissions To Try Terrorists, 25 Op. O.L.C. 8 (2001),
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2001/pub-millcommfinal.pdf (citing WINTHROP, supra note
3 and BIRKHIMER, supra note 3); Memorandum from Patrick Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, Swift Justice Authorization Act 4 (Apr. 8, 2002) (citing BIRKHIMER, supra note 3), available
at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020408.pdf
165. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within
the United States 10 n.15 (Oct. 23, 2001) (citing Abraham D. Sofaer, The Power over War, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 33, 41 (1995)), available at http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/
documents/20011023.pdf.
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closely analogous to the current attacks to the extent that they
involve attacks by non-state actors that do not take place in the
context of a rebellion or civil war. The analogy comes from the
irregular warfare carried on in the Indian Wars on the western
frontier during the nineteenth century. Indian "nations" were not
independent, sovereign nations in the sense of classical
international law, nor were Indian tribe rebels attempting to
establish states. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has explained
that the conflicts between Indians and the United States in various
circumstances were properly understood as "war." Thus, in
Montoya v. United States, the Court (for purposes of a
compensation statute passed by Congress) examined whether
certain attacks were carried out by Indians from tribes "in amity"
with the United States, which the Court approached by determining
whether the Indians were at "war." The Court explained that the
critical factor was whether the Indians' attacks were undertaken for
private gain or as a general attack upon the United States: "If their
hostile acts are directed against the Government or against all
settlers with whom they come in contact, it is evidence of an act of
war."
Similarly, after the Modoc Indian War of 1873, the Attorney
General opined that prisoners taken during the war who were
accused of killing certain officers who had gone to parley under a
flag of truce were subject to the laws of war and could be tried by a
military commission. The attorney general acknowledged that "[i]t
is difficult to define exactly the relations of the Indian tribes to the
United States," but concluded that "as they frequently carry on
organized and protracted wars, they may properly, as it seems to
me, be held subject to those rules of warfare which make a
negotiation for peace after hostilities possible, and which make
perfidy like that in question punishable by military authority."
Several Indian prisoners were tried by military commission and
executed.' 66
Relying upon a century-old Attorney General opinion, this author either
did not know about, or was not persuaded by, the fact that the Modoc people
had been victimized by the slaughter of forty-one Modocs during a similar
"peace parley" in 1852, an enormous part of the reason for the Modoc Wars
of 1871-1873."6 To this day, the trials of the Modoc leaders who
166. Legality of the Use of Military Commissions To Try Terrorists, supra note 164, at 25-26
(citations omitted).
167. ALTON PRYOR, CALIFORNIA'S HIDDEN GOLD: NUGGETS FROM THE STATE'S RICH
HISTORY 174 (2002).
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participated in the 1852 peace parley killings are controversial, and even
hypocritical:
The two sides in the Modoc wars crimes trial were also
mismatched, for the Modoc defendants were not represented by
counsel and the United States government held them to a higher
standard that it did its own soldiers. The U.S. soldiers who violated
the [rules] of war during the Modoc ... wars were never tried and
punished as war criminals.' 68
Had the memo writer described the events surrounding the Modoc war-
crimes trial, the underlying legal authority would have collapsed. The leader
in charge of the military commission in 1873, General Jefferson Davis,
complained to the press that he would have preferred summary executions of
the Modocs and that any trial would take several months of unduly
burdensome due process. 69 After the War Department forced him to initiate
war-crimes trials using a military commission, General Davis appointed
military men with deep emotional hatred toward the Modoc defendants and
hastened the opening of the trial to prevent an attorney hoping to represent
the Modocs from arriving on time.170 Thus the conviction and execution of
the Modocs was inevitable. This is a sad legal precedent upon which the
modem American government relied.
Unfortunately, the federal government continues the long-standing
practice of invoking the Indian warrior stereotype in its efforts to try and
prosecute individuals captured in the current war on terror. In the recent
prosecution by military commission of two alleged terrorists, government
attorneys invoked precedents from the First Seminole War:
Ambrister and Arbuthnot, both British subjects without any duty
or allegiance to the United States, were tried and punished for
conduct amounting to aiding the enemy. Examination of their case
reveals that their conduct was viewed as wrongful, in that they
were assisting unlawful hostilities by the Seminoles and their
allies. Further, not only was the Seminole belligerency unlawful,
but, much like modern-day al Qaeda, the very way in which the
Seminoles waged war against U.S. targets itself violated the
customs and usages of war. Because Ambrister and Arbuthnot
aided the Seminoles both to carry on an unlawful belligerency and
to violate the laws of war, their conduct was wrongful and
168. Doug Foster, Imperfect Justice: The Modoc War Crimes Trial of 1873, 100 OR. HIST. Q.
246, 248 (1999); see also id. at 256, 258-60 (detailing a litany of substantive errors during the trial
that made any assertion of fairness a sad joke).
169. Id. at 258.
170. Id. at 258-60.
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punishable.171
As with the Modoc precedent, this history is incomplete without
additional context. The National Congress of American Indians immediately
responded to the government's reliance upon the Seminole precedent with
this statement:
This is an astonishing statement of revisionist history. General
Jackson was ordered by President Monroe to lead a campaign
against Seminole and Creek Indians in Georgia. The politically
ambitious Jackson used these orders as an excuse to invade
Spanish-held Florida and begin an illegal war, burning entire
Indian villages in a campaign of extermination. The Seminole
efforts to defend themselves from an invading genocidal army
could be termed an "unlawful belligerency" only by the most
jingoistic military historian. General Jackson narrowly escaped
censure in the U.S. Congress, was condemned in the international
community, and his historical reputation was stained with
dishonor.17 2
Professor Deborah Rosen noted that Americans "vigorously debated"
General Jackson's decision to execute two British subjects,173 suggesting
that the government's Seminole precedent is perhaps even weaker than the
Modoc precedent. General Jackson affirmed the court martial's death
sentence of Arbuthnot.174 While doing so, General Jackson overrode the
court martial sentence of fifty lashes for Ambrister and instead imposed a
death sentence by firing squad.175 There was no written authority for General
Jackson to try these British subjects by court martial during the Seminole
War, and so his decision may or may not have been consistent with the laws
of war at the time.' 76 Moreover, contemporaneous critics argued that a court
martial could only be used against American military officers, and so
Jackson had no authority to try the two men.177 Finally, unlike General
171. Appellee's Response to the Specified Issues, supra note 1.
172. Letter from John H. Dossett, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Congress of Am. Indians, to U.S. Court
of Military Comm'n Review 1-2 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://turletalk.files.wordpress.com/
2011/03/ncai-amicus-letter-in-al-bahlul.pdf.
173. Deborah A. Rosen, Wartime Prisoners and the Rule of Law: Andrew Jackson's Military
Tribunals During the First Seminole War, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLiC 559, 559 (2008); see also id at
560 (noting that the controversy was as important to some as the admission of Missouri into the
Union as a slave state).
174. Id. at 563.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 565.
177. Id. at 567.
228 [ 15:2012]
HeinOnline  -- 15 J. Gender Race & Just. 228 2012
Indian Wars: Old & New
Davis, General Jackson never sought the advice or conmnand of the
President and instead executed the men without presidential approval.'
B. New Indian Wars
The war on terror's latest event-the capture and killing of Osama bin
Laden by American military forces-unfortunately continues the
stereotyping of American Indians as enemies of the United States. As the
New York Times reported:
On Sunday afternoon, as the helicopters raced over Pakistani
territory, the president and his advisers gathered in the Situation
Room of the White House to monitor the operation as it unfolded.
Much of the time was spent in silence. Mr. Obama looked "stone
faced," one aide said. Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. fingered
his rosary beads. "The minutes passed like days," recalled John 0.
Brennan, the White House counterterrorism chief.
The code name for Bin Laden was "Geronimo." The president
and his advisers watched Leon E. Panetta, the C.I.A. director, on a
video screen, narrating from his agency's headquarters across the
Potomac River what was happening in faraway Pakistan.
"They've reached the target," he said.
Minutes passed.
"We have a visual on Geronimo," he said.
A few minutes later: "Geronimo EKIA."
Enemy Killed In Action. There was silence in the Situation
Room.179
Geronimo, of course, is a major hero to many American Indians. But to
the American military-and likely the vast majority of other Americans-
Geronimo symbolizes the ultimate American military foe, one who evades
capture after years fighting and eventually succumbs to American military
might. As Angie Debo described the import of Geronimo's capture:
"APACHE WAR ENDED!" "GERONIMO CAPTURED!" Never were so
many headlines owed by so many to so few. From the time these
Indians had broken away, five thousand men of the regular army, a
network of heliograph stations flashing mirror messages from
mountain to mountain, and false promises at the end were required
to effect [sic] their "capture." The paper work flowed in rivers of
telegrams from army posts to Washington; since then it has
178. Rosen, supra note 173, at 568-69.
179. Mazzetti et al., supra note 4.
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burgeoned into many books.'8 0
For the American military, at least as a symbolic manner, the code-
name designation of Osama bin Laden as Geronimo makes perfect, logical
sense. Yet the Chiricahua Apache people remain, as do the Modocs and the
Seminoles and the Dakotas, now all American citizens, and many are
conflicted in sharing in the celebrated capture and killing of an American
enemy because of the unnecessary designation of the American enemy as an
Indian.
V. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that the Indian wars of early American history continue to
leave a footprint on modem American law and policy, just as war appears to
symbolize American focus on a particular problem such as poverty or drugs.
For American Indians, this fixation on war-and especially Indian wars-
has been, at best, a mixed bag. The war on poverty helped American Indians
mobilize toward a goal of tribal self-determination, and blazed a trail for the
federal government's efforts to support tribal self-sufficiency. The war on
drugs has seemingly persuaded tribal governments concerned about drug and
alcohol abuse in Indian country to go full bore in expanding drug testing to
tribal-government employees and tribal-housing occupants in a manner not
otherwise required or allowed by the federal government. Finally, the
current war on terror has resurrected many of the stereotypes and
philosophies of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Indian wars in
surprising and disappointing ways.
This Article serves as a survey of the impacts of these domestic wars on
Indian people. American political rhetoric seems to vacillate wildly between
treating American Indian tribes and Indian people with respect and treating
Indians and tribes as extinct or warlike, vicious savages-sometimes in the
same political discussion. The United States cannot seem to separate the
violent origins of the American Republic and the equally violent
dispossession of Indian lands, celebrating them openly even as a significant
portion of its citizenry continue to suffer the after-effects. It is certain that
Indians and wars will be linked together by American policymakers for
some time, but it is also certain that Indian people and Indian tribes will
continue to oppose the perpetuation of negative stereotypes. Indian tribes are
timeless entities, and Indian people will outlast any war thrown their way.
180. ANGIE DEBO, GERONIMO: THE MAN, His TIME, His PLACE 3 (1976).
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